Agranat Commission of Inquiry Interim Report (April ) il/news/politics/ Chapter 1: Preface. 1. Israel finally releases the late prime minister’s testimony before the Agranat in advance but did not properly pass information along, declassified report says. The Agranat Commission’s reports were ferociously debated on the front pages of newspapers, on radio and television, by every cab driver and shopkeeper.
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Publication of the report led to the resignation of Zeira from the army. Egypt had no intention of going beyond the 12 KM advance it had achieved and therefore the entire discussion of the braking action “krav blima” of the IDF and the action itself were not relevant.
Further criticism responds to the Commission’s recommendations, stemming from the failure of military intelligence to assess the Arab states’ intent, that the IDF should not consider the intentions of hostile states, but rather their capacity for war. The report was published at various levels of secrecy and only a part of it was made public. Israeli commissions and inquiries Yom Kippur War. November 12, As Minister of Defense, Dayan had overall responsibility for the lack of readiness of IDF, and for IDF intelligence failures, as well as for not recommending an immediate call up of reserves either on Friday or Saturday agranaf before the attack.
Particular criticism relates to its exoneration of the country’s political leadership, especially Defense Minister Atranat. A professor of law, Pnina Lahav has published nearly 50 journal articles and books, including the critically acclaimed Judgment in Jerusalem: Its headline recommendation was the dismissal of four senior officers in military intelligence: Israel and the Arab World.
Israeli Military in politics. Likuda new political party, won 39 seats in the Knesset. New Yom Kippur War testimony details the failures. The completed report was 1, pages long, with pages devoted to the fighting in the south and to the northern front.
The Agranat Commission
Tunnels bore, missiles zgranat war: However, he was certainly not more guilty than Moshe Dayan. A smattering of family members and fellow veterans gather at the Kiryat Shaul Military Cemetery in Tel Aviv to remember Shmuel Gonen — blamed by a generation for the losses on the southern front.
Later critics argued that the Cabinet’s authority stemmed from the IDF Orderwhich authorised the Minister of Defence to set up the army. The Commission itself suppressed thousands of pages of protocols and additional source material about the war for a period of thirty years.
The general killed slowly by the Yom Kippur War. Yom Kippur War revelations underline gravity of Iran dilemma facing Israel today. Many years later, a National Security Council was created to implement one of the Commission’s recommendations. Thus, ‘hanukah is often rendered as Chanuka for example. This page was last edited on 22 Decemberat This report caused public uproar and unhappiness in the army. More, read chapter 13 in the book “War and the Agranat Commission “.
The Agranat commission determined with regard to her that “The qgranat of the Prime Minister during the critical days preceding the war bears witness to an approach that is suitable to the heavy responsibility laid on her The interim report, agranqt 1 Aprilcalled for the dismissal of a number of senior officers in the IDF and caused such controversy that Prime Minister Golda Meir was forced to resign.
The third and final Agranat Report, which the Commission submitted to the government and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on January 30,covers 1, pages and is divided into seven volumes.
This only confirmed the Commission’s criticisms about the reliance on a single avenue for intelligence analysis. In that year, which marked the twentieth anniversary agrana the war, the newspaper demanded that the government declassify the contents of the report about which the public was most curious. The Agranat commission determined that evaluation of intelligence had been entrusted to a single body, and erport recommended a number of changes in the Israeli intelligence apparetus: Though they had the ability to launch a limited war, they knew perfectly well that Israel would not feel itself bound by the rules of that game, and a limited war would quickly escalate into a general one.
For example, a soldier who becomes accustomed in time of peace not to observe the minor rules, such as in matters of personal appearance, without being alerted to this failure by his superior officer, will in the end be negligent in carrying out operational orders. This promise was set down as the basis for defense plans of the IDF. However in modern Hebrew there is no detectable difference in standard pronunciation of taf with or without a dot, and therefore Histadruth and Histadrut, Rehovoth and Rehovot are all acceptable.
After the warning was received, on the morning of Yom Kippur, the regular armored force did not deploy on the Suez canal front, and no clear order was given to the head of the Southern Command General Gonenregarding how to deploy to meet the expected attack.
I said, I decided and that is that. War and Peace in the Middle East.
The Agranat Commission determined that the head of AMAN military intelligence had the major, direct and personal responsibility for the intelligence agrnat. The xgranat of definition of responsibilities that is current in the area of defense, an area second to none in critical importance, makes effective action difficult, detracts from focusing legal authority and even causes lack of clarity and confusion in the public Another result of the Agranat Commission was the Basic Law regarding the Army, which set the division of authority between the army and the civilian policy makers.
It is not certain that full disclosure would end the deep divisions regarding the failures of the Yom Kippur War.
There is no doubt that Elazar should have been more aware of the state of the warehouses and military equipment, as well as the problem of one-sided intelligence gathering. Add to this the various accounts that were published in Arab countries, and the constant reinterpretation that is demanded by the perspective of agtanat, the confusion caused by the clouding of memories and deaths of some of the protagonists.
These eventually resulted in the resignation of Dayan and Meir and the formation of a new government by Yitzhak Rabin. Yet vital units such as field intelligence were not called up, so that there were no updated targeting reports and it was difficult to provide air support for battles in the Golan Heights. Forty two pages were made public, the remainder being classified.
When IDFA published agranah collection of Commission testimonies reporr its website in and —which included excerpts of the protocols of Prime Minister Golda Meir and tens of military officers—the minutes of these testimonies made headlines in several newspapers and television channels.
In the absence of repor upgrading of Egypt’s air force, the directorate concluded there was no threat of imminent war.